In the aftermath of yet another North Korean nuclear test (possibly of a hydrogen bomb), it’s worth remembering a different nuclear deal in a different era. Here’s Bill Clinton celebrating his 1994 agreement with North Korea:
Good afternoon. I am pleased that the United States and North Korea yesterday reached agreement on the text of a framework document on North Korea’s nuclear program. This agreement will help to achieve a longstanding and vital American objective: an end to the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.
This agreement is good for the United States, good for our allies, and good for the safety of the entire world. It reduces the danger of the threat of nuclear spreading in the region. It’s a crucial step toward drawing North Korea into the global community . . . This agreement represents the first step on the road to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. It does not rely on trust. Compliance will be certified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States and North Korea have also agreed to ease trade restrictions and to move toward establishing liaison offices in each other’s capitals. These offices will ease North Korea’s isolation.
Note that the agreement wasn’t merely going to stop nuclear proliferation, it was a step towards “drawing North Korea into the global community.” And of course there’s the assurance that the agreement “does not rely on trust.” Compliance “will be certified.”
Yet the agreement was a complete and predictable failure. North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. It remains an isolated, paranoid, and totalitarian dictatorship. And it’s busy working on ballistic missiles that expand the potential reach of its nuclear arsenal.
Will the Iran deal meet the same fate? President Obama’s promises are certainly the same.
Iran won’t obtain a nuclear weapon:
The agreement now reached between the international community and the Islamic Republic of Iran builds on this tradition of strong, principled diplomacy. After two years of negotiations, we have achieved a detailed arrangement that permanently prohibits Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
The agreement doesn’t rely on trust:
It contains the most comprehensive inspection and verification regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program . . . Inspectors will be allowed daily access to Iran’s key nuclear sites. If there is a reason for inspecting a suspicious, undeclared site anywhere in Iran, inspectors will get that access, even if Iran objects. This access can be with as little as 24 hours’ notice. And while the process for resolving a dispute about access can take up to 24 days, once we’ve identified a site that raises suspicion, we will be watching it continuously until inspectors get in. And by the way, nuclear material isn’t something you hide in the closet. It can leave a trace for years. The bottom line is, if Iran cheats, we can catch them — and we will.
And it well help draw Iran into global community:
Since Iran’s Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons, this framework gives Iran the opportunity to verify that its program is, in fact, peaceful. It demonstrates that if Iran complies with its international obligations, then it can fully rejoin the community of nations, thereby fulfilling the extraordinary talent and aspirations of the Iranian people. That would be good for Iran, and it would be good for the world.
Given Iran’s immediate provocations following the deal — including defying the U.N. with ballistic missile tests and firing a rocket roughly a mile from an American aircraft carrier — there’s even less hope for compliance from Iran than North Korea. We face the prospect of confronting an oil-rich, nuclear-armed terrorist superstate – led by men who follow an apocalyptic, jihadist faith. And when we do, we will once again realize that we have learned nothing from the past.
The Eerie Similarity Between Clinton's Rhetoric on North Korea and Obama's Rhetoric on Iran